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1. Enactivism and the sensorimotor account 
 
Enactivism, ever since its first formulation by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, has always laid 
great emphasis on organism/environment interactions as the proper framework for studying 
cognition. Minds have to be understood as ―enacted‖ by situationally embedded living 
organisms.  
 
By proposing this approach to minds, enactivists have explicitly opposed themselves to 
cognitivists, who take representation as their central posit (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991). 
Thus, it is claimed that cognition is, rather than representation of the world, ―the enactment of 
a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world 
performs‖ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 9; see also Thompson 2007). True to the 
enactivist motto that ―a path is laid down in walking,‖ the role of internally stored rules and 
representations in accounting for cognition is thus replaced by an embodied history of 
interactions.  
 
By taking up this position, enactivism reveals itself as committed to a strong notion of 
embodiment. Such a concept has to be distinguished from other senses of embodiment. One 
way to use ―embodiment‖ is to emphasize the role of the particular properties of the body in 
shaping our cognitive capacities. Thus, to give a rather trite example, it could be argued that 
having ten fingers lies at the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has a basis 
in the body. Such a use of the notion of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a 
traditional cognitive science approach, in which computations and internal representations are 
assigned a key role for explaining our cognitive capacities. In particular, one could conceive 
of the specifics of the body as constraining the form or content of our representations or 
computations. 
 
In the sense of ―embodied‖ at stake here, ―embodied‖ is used in contrast with 
―representational,‖ such that saying that some capacity is embodied is to deny that it involves 
internal representations. One could argue, for example, that people embody the rules of their 
native language, in the sense that the rules are manifest, and only manifest in their utterances, 
or other practical dealings with language. The structure of language then is implicit in the 
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practices; it is spread out in time, not represented anywhere. Of course, one could not embody 
rules without having a body engaged in the relevant, rule manifesting, activities, but the 
emphasis here lies not on the specifics of that body, but on what could be called the primacy 
of embodiment over representation. We will take enactivism as stating that cognition is 
embodied  in this strong, or ―radical‖ sense (Chemero 2009, Hutto & Myin 2013).  
 
In the domain of perception, enactivism has become associated with the so called  
sensorimotor contingency approach presented in O‘Regan and Noë (2001). Vision, according 
to the sensorimotor approach ―is something we do, rather than something that happens in us‖ 
(O‘Regan & Noë 2001). The approach rejects the view on vision as aimed at producing 
―faithful metric-preserving replica of the outside world inside the head‖ (O‘Regan 1992). 
Instead, seeing is conceived of as an ―exploratory activity,‖ ―attuned to‖ sensorimotor 
contingencies, or ways in which sensory stimulation changes with movement—such as when 
a retinal image changes when one walks around an object. Seeing a scene or an object is, in 
the sensorimotor approach, comparable to feeling a surface or object, where the experience is 
of the whole surface or object, despite the fact that momentary tactile stimulation is limited to 
the fingertips making contact only at particular places.  
 
Sensorimotor theorists have argued that the idea that vision should be understood as 
temporally extended interaction is supported by the insights it provides into the nature and 
character of perceptual experiences. According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual 
experiences owe their identity to the patterns of sensorimotor contingencies typical of the 
kinds of organism/environment interactions those experiences normally arise in. For example, 
tactile feelings of hardness or softness are determined by particular patterns of experiences 
one has when engaging in such activities as squishing a sponge or pushing a brick wall. 
Similarly, that expertiences of seeing differ as a class from experiences of hearing is due, 
according to the sensorimotor theory, to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies specific to 
vision and audition, such as that in seeing, but not in hearing, stimulation from a particular 
source stops when one turns one‘s head sideways, or closes one‘s eyes.  
 
The crucial role played by patterns of sensorimotor contingency in shaping perceptual 
experience has been seen as supported by findings on adaptation to distorting or inverting 
glasses, as well as findings of experiments with sensory substitution devices (Hurley & Noë 
2003; Noë 2004; O‘Regan 2011). For it seems that experiential change here follows on the 
heels of adaptation to patterns of sensorimotor contingencies.  
 
The sensorimotor approach has been met with strong opposition and criticism, often 
formulated as criticism of enactivist approaches to perception generally (e.g. Block 2005; 
Prinz 2006, 2009). Critics of the sensorimotor approach have been puzzled, both by general 
claims about the role of sensorimotor contingies in shaping experience and by the appeal to 
phenomena such as sensory substitution and distorted vision. Some critics have reached the 
verdict that these phenomena support the sensorimotor approach in no way whatsoever. They 
have further held that the sensorimotor claims regarding the determination of experiential 
quality fly in the face of the simplest observations about experience in imagery, dreaming or 
paralysis, in which experience seems radically disconnected from any presently obtaining 
patterns of sensorimotor interaction. 
 
We will discuss the sensorimotor approach in the light of the broader enactivism as sketched 
above.  We shall argue that spelling out the sensorimotor theory along enactivist lines, 
replacing representation by attunement due to a history of interactions, allows for a truly 
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distinctive sensorimotor approach. This enactive sensorimotor approach is in perfect harmony 
with evidence about core phenomena such as vision with inverting glasses and sensory 
substitution. Moreover, an enactive sensorimotor approach allows for the accommodation of 
experiences such as in dreaming and perceptual imagery.   
 
 
2. Enactive sensorimotor vision  
 
Let us first return to the sensorimotor contingency account, as presented in O‘Regan and Noë 
(2001). ―Vision,‖ it was said there, is ―a mode of exploration of the world, mediated by 
knowledge of (…) sensorimotor contingencies‖ (p. 940), the latter being characterized as ―the 
structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by various motor actions‖ (p. 
941). It was emphasized that the knowledge involved is ―implict,‖ leading to a view of 
perception as a ―skillful activity.‖ The sensorimotor approach was presented as being opposed 
to approaches based on the assumption ―that vision consists in the creation of an internal 
representation of the outside world whose activation somehow generates visual experience‖ 
(O‘Regan & Noë 2001: 940).  
 
In order to get a firmer grip on the sensorimotor approach, it is helpful to look in some more 
detail at how the sensorimotor approach has been applied to a number of perceptual 
phenomena, in O‘Regan and Noë (2001), and on later occasions (e.g. O‘Regan 2011). 
 
As a first one of such, consider expanded vision. By ―expanded vision‖ is meant the kind of 
visual experience as when standing in front of a scene and overseeing it, looking at a large 
screen, or holding a book opened in one‘s hand and having the experience of seeing both 
pages. Expanded vision is characterized by the experienced spatial and temporal continuity of 
what is seen. Essentially, seeing a scene is having the feeling of being in roughly 
simultaneous visual contact with a certain extent of the world.  
 
Though expanded vision comes very naturally to us, certain by now well-known facts seem to 
stand in the way of a straightforward explanation of it. One relevant fact is that subjects are 
not continuously accessing the whole scene in the same high-quality way, due to such factors 
as differences in the spatial distribution of receptors in the retina, and the presence of the blind 
spot (O‘Regan 1992, 2011). The absence of homogenous simultaneous access is further 
highlighted by results from studies on change blindness and inattentional blindness, for they 
show that large changes in a scene can go unnoticed, for example when other changes are 
particularly conspicuous.  
 
One way to explain expanded vision in the face of these facts it to relegate the homogeneity to 
something like the ―internal representation of the outside world‖ (reiterating O‘Regan & Noë 
2001). An inhomogeneous and gappy retinal image would be ―filled in‖ to produce a 
homogenous complete representation, to which or through which simultaneous access would 
still be possible.  
 
The sensorimotor approach denies the need for such an inner simulacrum of temporal or 
spatial continuity. Instead it accounts for continuity in terms of sensorimotor regularities. One 
should not be misled by the fact of instantaneous access: perceivers have high quality 
momentary access to only limited parts of the scene, while momentary access to other parts of 
the scene is of low quality. What is crucial, according to the sensorimotor approach, is that 
perceivers are set up to react to sudden changes in visual characteristics, so that, normally, 
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any such significant change will not go unnoticed, but will lead the perceiver to focus on it. 
The trick to a successful change blindness experiment is to tamper with this ―grabbiness‖ or 
―alerting capacity‖ (O‘Regan, Myin & Noë 2005) of environmental changes, by introducing 
an even larger visual alteration such as a blank screen between two pictures of a scene before 
and after changes. Seeing the scene in an expanded way, then, is not the consequence of an 
expanded representation, but of one‘s capacity to interact with the scene.  
 
Next, consider seeing an object. Sensorimotor theorists, following Donald MacKay, have 
compared the visual experience in object vision to the tactile experience of holding a bottle. 
The actual tactile contact with the bottle is only limited to where the fingers touch the bottle. 
Nevertheless, the experience is of a bottle, and not of disconnected bits of hard material. 
Again, one could invoke a homogenous representation to account for the experience of the 
whole object. Again the sensorimotor approach prefers an account in terms of being ―attuned‖ 
to a sensorimotor pattern (O‘Regan & Noë 2001). The experience of feeling the whole bottle 
is then explained by the fact that one is attuned to the changes in stimulation that will occur 
when one makes certain movements. No representation needs to mediate, underlie or be 
causally involved in such a state of attunement. The same is claimed for seeing an object. To 
perceive a 3-D object currently seen only from one side as a 3-D object, one then does not 
need a representation: it suffices that one is attuned to the kinds of changes in stimulation that 
will result when either the object moves or when one moves with respect to it.  
 
Thirdly, take seeing a color. It is a well-known fact, named ―approximate color constancy,‖ 
that we more or less see the colors surfaces actually have, even if the stimulus that reaches the 
eye is a product of both the surface‘s color and the contingent current illumination. Color 
experience is not a response to the local light as it currently reaches you; it is sensitive to a 
permanent surface property. A fundamental challenge for color science is to explain how this 
can happen. An enactive sensorimotor approach to color experience, in line with the accounts 
of expanded vision and object vision above, hooks on to the temporal extendedness of color 
perception (Broackes 1992; Noë 2004; O‘Regan 2011). The permanent property of color is 
identified with a reflectance profile: the way the surface reflects light under different lighting 
conditions. One can find out about the reflectance profile property by moving the colored 
object around or by observing surfaces under changing lighting conditions. Over time, one 
becomes sensitive to the underlying reflectance profile of a surface on the basis of minimal 
cues. Just as one can recognize a familiar person from a glimpse, one can recognize a 
reflectance profile on the basis of the behavior of the surface in a minimal set of lighting 
conditions. Such a minimal set, moreover, is almost always available, as it exists when 
different nearby objects reflect differently on a surface (Ruppertsberg & Bloj 2007). In short, 
being capable of seeing colors then consists of being attuned to reflectance profiles, or to the 
changes in stimulation one would receive under various circumstances (see Phillipona & 
O‘Regan 2006).  
 
This way of looking at color illustrates the overall sensorimotor take on the qualitative 
character of perceptual experience. The sensorimotor approach claims that both the character 
of sensory qualities within a modality, such as the difference between softness and hardness, 
as well as differences between the character of modalities as a whole, are determined by 
differences in classes of sensorimotor contingencies typical of perceptual interactions. The 
experiential quality of softness differs from the quality of hardness, because of the different 
effects of pressing or squeezing. Similary, touch differs from vision, among other things 
because tactile, but not visual experience of an object comes to an end when immediate bodily 
contact is lost.  
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In the different cases of application of the sensorimotor approach surveyed in the above, the 
notion of ―being attuned to sensorimotor contingencies‖ has played a prominent role. This 
raises questions about its precise meaning. What does it mean that a person is attuned to the 
sensorimotor contingencies of ―red‖ or ―softness‖? A way of answering that question offered 
in O‘Regan and Noë (2001) appeals to the exercise of the ―mastery‖ or ―knowledge‖ of 
sensorimotor contingencies, building on the already mentioned characterization of ―vision as 
exploratory activity mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.‖ 
 
A problem with an appeal to knowledge is that it allows a representational interpretation, 
while the representationalist framework was resisted in the context of inner simulacra 
accounting for expanded vision. On such an interpretation, having knowledge about 
sensorimotor contingencies involves representing those sensorimotor contingencies. Perhaps 
the specification, in O‘Regan & Noë (2001) and elsewhere, that the knowledge is meant to be 
―implicit,‖ is aimed at excluding such an interpretation in favor of an approach based on 
practical know-how, or skills. However, as pointed out by Daniel Hutto, insisting that 
knowledge is meant to be ―implicit‖ is not compatible with supposing that the knowledge 
plays a ―mediating‖ role (Hutto 2005). An appeal to mediating knowledge would imply 
commitment to an intermediating representational stage. Consistency with the initial non-
representationalism of the sensorimotor approach can be regained by conceiving of 
―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ as embodied in the strong sense mentioned at the 
beginning of this entry. Attunement to sensorimotor contingencies then means that an 
organism has acquired, on the basis of a history of interactions, a sensitivity in its perception 
and action for the ways stimuli change with movement. 
 
In line with the strong notion of embodiment, the development of perceptual attunement is not 
conceived of in representationalist terms: the past is not playing its role in the present as 
represented past – as mediated by representations of the past. Enactivists relying on the strong 
notion of embodiment will insist that what a history of attunement has yielded is just that: 
attunement. Of course, attunement is attunement to certain external conditions. Call this the 
external aspect of attunement. Moreover, attunement is impossible without changed 
conditions in the organism. Call this the internal aspect of attunement. The mere existence of 
external and internal aspects of attunement do not necessitate representational descriptions, 
however. It is not because an organism has become attuned to certain circumstances that it 
represents those circumstances by some internal means. This is obvious in noncognitive 
evolutionary adaptations: a bird‘s wings partially constitute the bird‘s internal conditions for 
moving appropriately in an aerial environment, but this does not imply that the bird or its 
wings represent these external conditions. Analogously, in the cognitive case, there is no 
logical need to describe the internal conditions that mediate cognitive attunements as 
representing the external circumstances of attunement.  
 
The upshot is that, once the strong notion of embodiment is adhered to, a historical or 
developmental aspect comes to the fore, in a nonrepresentationalist shape. 
Representationalists cannot deny a role for an organism‘s history, but they may insist that an 
occurrent representation of the past needs to stand in for the real past, if the past is to yields an 
influence now. An enactive sensorimotor approach—that is, one defining attunement in the 
strong sense of embodiment—denies that the changes laid down in an organism‘s history need 
to be representational. Without being representational, these changes can still retain their 
causal powers and allow for a bridge between the past and the present.  
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The enactive sensorimotor approach thus has the advantage of offering a reading of 
―attunement to sensorimotor contingencies‖ which is consistent with the anti-
representationalism present in the sensorimotor analysis of expanded vision, object vision, 
and the experience of properties such as softness or color.  
 
 
3. Attunement in action 
 
How does the enactive sensorimotor position relate to evidence to which sensorimotor 
theorists have appealed, in particular findings about adaptation to distorting glasses or about 
sensory substitution?  Critics of the sensorimotor approach to perception and perceptual 
awareness have challenged it on this front, claiming that neither findings about distorting 
glasses or about sensory substitution confirm the sensorimotor approach (Block 2005; Prinz 
2006; Klein 2007).  
 
By means of lenses or prisms, the light entering the eyes can be inverted in a left-right and/or 
an above-below dimension. This introduces systematic changes in the perceiver‘s visual 
sensorimotor interaction with the environment. It has been reported that after extensive 
wearing of inverting glasses (within 6-10 days), visual abilities can be re-acquired and one 
may once again learn to see where things are (e.g. Stratton 1896, 1897; Taylor 1962; Kohler 
1964; Dolezal 1982; but see for example Linden et al. 1999 for negative findings).  
 
A phenomenon consistently reported throughout the literature is that, on first wearing 
inverting glasses, the stability of visual experience breaks down with head movements, as if 
the scene moves in front of one‘s eyes. This confirms that visual experience depends on 
sensorimotor contingencies, or on the relation between sensory stimulation and bodily 
movement (Taylor 1962), and not on sensory stimulation alone. For since sensory stimulation 
is only spatially inverted, dependence on sensory stimulation only predicts inverted, but not 
unstable experience.  Over the days, free-moving subjects adapt to the new situation and 
movement of the head no longer disrupts visual stability. The subject has become attuned to 
the novel sensorimotor contingencies, so that environmental movements lead to a distinctively 
visual experience of movement of the scene, while movement of the perceiver‘s own point or 
direction of view does not. 
  
The crucial role of sensorimotor contingencies is further evidenced by the finding that, when 
studies use a chin rest to avoid head movement, adaptation is very restricted. Indeed, it seems 
that only adaptation of proprioceptive experiences—and no adaptation of visual experience—
takes place in studies in which subjects perform actions when head movements are thus 
avoided (for some examples see Harris 1965). We can make sense of this by distinguishing 
kinds of sensorimotor contingency, such as those related to exploratory activities such as 
looking from performatory activities such as grasping (Gibson 1964): genuinely visual 
adaptation to wearing inverting glasses depends strongly on active visual exploration.  
 
It is also clear that the distortion brought about by glasses affects different kinds of 
sensorimotor contingencies differently. Since the early reports of Stratton (1896, 1897), the 
focus of analysis in inversion studies has often been on the altered relation between vision on 
the one hand, and touch or bodily experiences on the other. However, inverting glasses 
introduce a conflict within spatial vision itself (Degenaar 2013). Head movements and eye 
movements involve different patterns of sensorimotor contingencies, some of which are 
changed and some of which remain unaffected under the distortion. A subject wearing the 
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glasses has to adapt to the altered patterns, while leaving the existing attunement to the 
unaltered patterns intact.  
 
Instead of leading to a prediction of a complete ―inversion of experience‖ (Klein 2007), a 
sensorimotor position thus leads to the expectation that experience, while certainly changing 
in systematic ways, will also retain continuities with experience before the goggles were put 
on. Sensorimotor theorists have emphasized that the sensorimotor view of vision as a set of 
sensorimotor capacities naturally allows for partial adaptation, and have pointed to such 
observations as that wearers of distorting goggles might have learned to see the positions of 
moving cars correctly, while still seeing the license plates as in a mirror (O‘Regan & Noë 
2001; O‘Regan 2011). 
 
Partial adaptation challenges the idea that vision is based on a unitary image or representation 
in the brain. It is thinking of vision in this distinctively nonsensorimotor way which leads to 
an expectation of ―re-inversion‖ of experience. The contrast between this way of thinking and 
a sensorimotor approach becomes even stronger when the latter is of the enactivist variety, for 
an enactivist sensorimotor approach is more fully, or at least more explicitly, 
nonrepresentational.  
 
Sensory substitution devices enable a new mode of interaction with the environment, for 
example by transforming an image recorded by a camera into a pattern of tactile stimulation 
on the subject‘s skin (e.g. Bach-y-Rita 1984) or into a pattern of auditory stimulation (e.g. 
Auvray et al. 2005; Auvray, Hanneton & O‘Regan 2007). It has been found that after practice 
with such tactile-to-visual or tactile-to-auditory substitution devices, in some cases blind or 
blindfolded subjects report the experience of objects in distal space, and describe vision-like 
experiences such as that objects increase in apparent size on approach. Following a training 
period, persons using a sensory substitution device have been found to acquire such capacities 
as involved in locomotor guidance, object localization, and object categorization (see Auvray 
& Myin 2009 for further information and pointers to the literature). 
 
As in the adaptation to inverting glasses, active exploration is required here: subjects must be 
able to control the camera in order to develop this kind of spatial experience (Bach-y-Rita 
1984; Auvray et al. 2005). Sensorimotor theorists have referred to this adaptation as evidence 
for the approach, because it shows the pivotal role of sensorimotor contingencies in visual 
behavior and attunement. If a set of sensorimotor contingencies—such as those concerning 
change in size upon approach or retreat—are transferred from vision to touch then they seem 
to enable vision-like behavior and experience once the subject is attuned to the contingencies.  
 
It is this positive point which is key: that, despite the novel modality these contingencies 
become embedded in, strikingly, they are able to entrain behavioral and experiential change. 
Critics of the sensorimotor approach have always been keen to point out that many, or at least 
some, aspects of experience remain linked to the modality the sensorimotor patterns are 
transferred to (e.g. Block 2005; Prinz 2006, 2009). Such an objection to the sensorimotor 
approach disregards that the approach, just as was the case for inverting glasses, predicts a 
mixture of continuity and change in experience after having learned to perceive with a 
sensory substitution device. Sensory substitution devices add to the sensorimotor repertoire of 
the stimulated sense, without destroying the repertoire already present. Existing 
functionality—existing attunement to sensorimotor contingencies—remains in place. To the 
extent that aspects of the experiential character remain those of the ‗old‘ modality, this can be 
explained by the persistent attunement to the ‗old‘ sensorimotor contingencies. In other 
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words, the sensory modality a sensory substitution onto which the device is grafted, can show 
a level of ―tenacity‖ (Myin, Cooke & Zahidi, in press), or a lack of deference to the new 
sensorimotor context (Hurley & Noë 2003). 
 
 
4. Derivative experience 
 
This nuanced sensorimotor perspective on inverting glasses and sensory substitution 
exemplifies how experience, at any moment, is a product of both the current stimulation and 
currently obtaining sensorimotor contingencies, and attunement due to a history of 
interactions. This basic tenet of the sensorimotor position allows it to meet an often 
formulated complaint that the sensorimotor approach cannot account for perceptual or 
perceptual-like experience under circumstances in which occurent sensorimotor interactions 
differ from those characteristic of the experience. The range of cases invoked by critics 
includes dreaming, visual imagery and the perceptual experiences of paralyzed people.  
 
Invoking these as counter-examples to the sensorimotor approach neglects the explanatory 
role played by the history of interactions. An appeal to this history of interactions, and the 
process of attunement it entrains, is essential in the sensorimotor account of all forms of 
perception. The fact that one feels the whole bottle on the basis of minimal sensory contact, 
precisely transcends one‘s currently occurring sensory stimulation because of one‘s previous 
exposure to the sensorimotor contingencies of touching and exploring bottles. Because of this 
history, one is familiar with, or attuned to, a general pattern of sensorimotor contingencies 
typical of bottles, characterized by such regularities as that one will encounter more hard stuff 
when one slides one‘s fingers to either side. Dreaming, visual imagery and experience in 
paralysis, then, are cases in which the explanatory balance tips more fully in the direction of 
past sensorimotor contingencies. What one experiences under such circumstances is dictated 
almost exclusively by one‘s attunement to previous interactive regularities, rather than by 
one‘s current stimulation. In the sense in which the character of experience in such 
circumstances is due to past, rather than to current interactions, such experience is derivative. 
The derivative status of experiences in dreaming, imagery or paralysis, far from revealing 
them as being distant from sensorimotor interactions, in fact shows them to be deeply 
entrenched in them.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
An enactive sensorimotor account can answer common criticisms, and it has been shown, for 
example by the investigations of Philipona and O‘Regan (2006) on color, that the approach 
offers rich prospects for empirical expansion. Of course, there is need for further clarification 
and elaboration of the theoretical basis of the approach. Relevant steps are taken for example 
in the work of Buhrmann, Di Paolo and Barandiaran (2013) on the key concept of 
sensorimotor contingencies. The above makes clear that the sensorimotor approach, spelled 
out fully along enactivist lines, offers a strong, substantive and fruitful perspective on 
perception, for vision as well as for other modalities
i
.  
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Further reading 
 
The sensorimotor approach to perception has been developed in somewhat different directions 
by Kevin O‘Regan and Alva Noë, for example in the recent books Why Red Doesn’t Sound 
Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011) by Kevin O‘Regan, and Out of our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other 
Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009) by Alva Noë. 
Among other divergences, O‘Regan‘s book offers more links to empirical research, while 
Noë‘s book tries to adavance a case for the idea that consciousness in not confined to the 
brain. Evan Thompson‘s Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) has a chapter in which Thompson, one of 
the founders of enactivism, offers a sympathetic, but critical assessment of sensorimotor 
enactivism. Finally, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin‘s Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds 
Without Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013) presents arguments for construing 
enactivism and the sensorimotor approach in a radical, representation or content-eschewing 
way.  
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